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“Our overworked Supreme Court,” Puck cartoon by Joseph Keppler, 1885, Library of Congress.

A “PROGRESSIVE CONTRACTION OF JURISDICTION”:
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT
Carolyn Shapiro

T

he Supreme Court in 1888
was in crisis. Its structure
and responsibilities, created
a century earlier by the Judiciary Act
of 1789, were no longer adequate or
appropriate. The Court was overwhelmed by its docket, and the justices’ responsibilities, which included
circuit riding, were impossible to
meet. Shaped as it was by a law almost as old as the country itself, the
Supreme Court in 1888—and the
federal judicial system as a whole—
would be barely recognizable to
many today.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established not only the Supreme Court,
but also the entire federal court

system. The Act divided the country initially into thirteen districts,
which were in turn combined into
three circuits. Unlike today’s circuit
courts, however, the circuit courts
created in 1789 had original jurisdiction over certain types of cases and
provided appellate review of only
a few cases heard originally in the
district courts. In addition, the Judiciary Act provided for district court
judges and Supreme Court justices,
but no circuit court judges. Instead,
twice a year, two Supreme Court justices would visit each district and,
along with one district court judge,
would sit as the circuit court. There
were six Supreme Court justices, so
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that two could be assigned to each
circuit. Even after 1793, when subsequent laws provided that only
one Supreme Court justice at a time
would sit on a circuit courts, meaning that each justice had to make
the trip only once a year rather than
twice, an enormous portion of Supreme Court justices’ time, was
spent riding circuit—at a time when
travel was slow and difficult. And as
the country grew, more circuits were
created.
Not only did Supreme Court justices ride circuit, but the Supreme
Court itself had no discretion over
its docket. Cases were appealed to
the Supreme Court as of right, unlike
today. This lack of control turned out
to be extremely problematic. During
the first century of its existence, not
only did the United States become
geographically larger and more populous, but industry grew, the country’s economy became increasingly
sophisticated, and new laws and
sources of litigation abounded, especially after the Civil War. As a result,
the Supreme Court’s docket grew
dramatically. At the beginning of the
1888 Term, there were 1,563 cases on
the docket. The Court simply could
not keep up. As Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis described
the situation: “The Supreme Court
docket became a record of arrears.”
Less poetically, it took three years for
a case to be heard. The situation was
untenable.
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Faced with overwhelming caseloads, by 1888 the Supreme Court
had already attempted to adjust its
standard of review in order to dissuade lawyers and litigants from
appealing fact-intensive cases with
few implications beyond the particular parties. In Newell v. Norton and
Ship, an 1865 admiralty case involving a steamboat collision, for example, the Court summarily affirmed
the verdict for the plaintiff, holding
that there was “ample testimony to
support the decision.” The Court explained that it would not engage in
a searching review of the lengthy record, which included more than 100
depositions:
Parties ought not to expect this court
to revise their decrees merely on a
doubt raised in our minds as to the
correctness of their judgment, on
the credibility of witnesses, or the
weight of conflicting testimony.

The Court’s reluctance to engage
in error correction, even at a time when
it had no formal control of its docket,
continues to this day. Today, Supreme
Court Rule 10, Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certioari,
explains that a “petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous
factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”
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D

espite the Court’s effort to define
a very narrow scope of review, it
was unable to halt the flood of cases
coming to it. Facing both its own
swelling docket and the geographic
expansion of the country, the justices found circuit riding to be increasingly difficult and they often
simply did not do it. As Frankfurter
and Landis explain, “[B]y 1890 the
statutory duty of the Justices to attend circuit was practically a dead
letter.”
And it was not the Supreme
Court alone that was unable to function properly. Despite some earlier
attempts to expand and reform the
lower courts, there were still not
nearly enough judges. Circuit courts,
which were supposed to sit with two
judges, often had to function with
only one. Even more problematic,
that single judge was often a district
court judge who was hearing appeals
of his own decisions. In 1889, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association put
it this way:
Such an appeal is not from Philip
drunk to Philip sober, but from
Philip sober to Philip intoxicated
with the vanity of a matured opinion and doubtless also a published
decision.

This arrangement could not possibly
inspire confidence in an impartial
and fair justice system.
Congress finally acted in 1891,

after many years of considering and
rejecting proposals for major reform,
and the federal judicial system we
know today began to emerge. Most
significantly, Congress established
intermediate appellate courts for the
first time. If litigants were required
to appeal first to those intermediate
courts, the hope was, many fewer of
them would subsequently take their
cases to the Supreme Court. The law
indeed appeared to lessen the tide of
cases, at least at first. During 1890,
before passage, 623 new cases were
docketed at the Supreme Court. In
1892, the number dropped by more
than half, to 275.
The 1891 law, known as the Evarts
Act, also contained the seeds of today’s Court’s largely discretionary
jurisdiction. For the first time, Congress created a category of cases that
the Supreme Court would review
only upon certification, or certiorari,
although most cases continued to
flow to the Court as a matter of right.
The Supreme Court embraced
the opportunity to limit the number
of cases coming before it. During
the first two years after passage of
the 1891 act, it granted certiorari
in only two cases. While careful to
maintain its power to grant certiorari in any case pending in the courts
of appeals, the Court was, quite
deliberately, “chary of action in respect to certiorari,” as it explained
in Forsyth v. City of Hammond, decided in 1897. In Forsyth, the Court
announced narrow criteria for when
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“The Supreme Court/Men Who Know the Law,” October Term, 1895. Designed by the American Lithographic Co.,
1896, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.

certiorari would be appropriate:
[The certiorari] power will be
sparingly exercised, and only when
the circumstances of the case satisfy us that the importance of the
question involved, the necessity of
avoiding conflict between two or
more courts of appeal, or between
courts of appeal and the courts of a
state, or some matter affecting the
interests of this nation in its internal or external relations, demands
such exercise.

These criteria remain, largely unchanged, the stated criteria for certiorari today as set forth in Supreme
Court Rule 10.
The Evarts Act, however, was
not successful in its goal of cutting
the Court’s workload to a manageable size. It did not eliminate most

of the Court’s mandatory appellate
jurisdiction. The hope that the creation of the intermediate appellate
courts would satisfy litigants’ need
for appellate review, thereby making
an appeal to the Supreme Court less
attractive, proved largely illusory.
(Lawyers and litigants often apparently used the right of an appeal to
the Supreme Court simply as a delaying tactic, a possibility that seems
entirely obvious to a modern legal
audience.) In the years following the
enactment of the Evarts Act, the Supreme Court’s caseloads increased
again to unmanageable proportions,
as the nation, its economy, and its
judicial business continued to grow.
Moreover, even after 1891 and despite the concern for the Supreme
Court’s caseload that inspired the
Evarts Act, Congress continued to
create even more categories of man-
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datory appeals to the Court. In 1903,
for example, it passed the Expediting
Act, which created the three-judge
district court to hear certain antitrust cases. Appeals from this type
of district court went directly to the
Supreme Court as of right. And over
the following 10 to 15 years, Congress provided that more and more
types of cases follow this procedure.
(A handful of cases, such as constitutional challenges to congressional
districts, are subject to this procedure even today.)
Although it expanded the Court’s
mandatory jurisdiction in some areas, Congress did cut back on it in
others. In 1916, for example, Congress eliminated mandatory jurisdiction over Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, as well as certain
cases arising out of state courts, cases from the Philippines, and cases
arising under certain other federal
statutes. The most significant overhaul of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, however, was the 1925 Judges’
Bill—so called because it was drafted
by members of the Supreme Court
itself. The Act dramatically expanded the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction,
leaving only a few, relatively small
categories of cases for mandatory
appeals.
The goal of the Judges’ Bill, like
the Evarts Act, was to free the Court
from having to decide cases that were
not important to anyone beyond
the immediate parties involved and
to allow it to focus on more nation-

ally significant matters. The House
Committee report on the Judges’ Bill
explained:
The problem is whether the time
and attention and energy of the
court shall be devoted to matters
of large public concern, or whether
they shall be consumed by matters
of less concern, without especial
general interest, and only because
the litigant wants to have the court
of last resort pass upon his right.

In a 1925 Yale Law Review article,
Chief Justice William Howard Taft
provided more detail about what
sorts of cases he believed the Court
should take on certiorari after passage of the Judges’ Bill, reiterating
the criteria the Court first articulated in the 1890s—and that today are
embodied in Rule 10:
The function of the Supreme
Court is conceived to be . . . the
consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, the application of which are of wide public or governmental interest, and
which should be authoritatively
declared by the final court. Such
cases should include issues of the
Federal constitutional validity of
statutes, Federal and State, genuine
issues of constitutional rights of
individuals, the interpretation of
Federal statutes when it will affect
large classes of people, questions
of Federal jurisdiction, and some-
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times doubtful questions of general law of such wide application
that the Supreme Court may help
remove the doubt. Where there
is a conflict of opinion between
intermediate appellate courts in
the different Circuits or between
the Federal intermediate appellate
courts and the Supreme Courts of
the States, the public interest certainly requires that the Supreme
Court hear the cases, if its decision
will remove the conflict.

The Judges’ Bill did not completely eliminate caseload pressures,
of course. Petitions for certiorari alone
topped 5,000 a year by the early 1980s.
In October Term 2011, the Court considered more than 7,500 petitions,
although this number represents a
modest decrease from prior years.
Despite these massive numbers,
however, the Court has not fallen
behind in dealing with these filings.
Instead, it has adopted a variety
of ways of dealing with them efficiently—from eliminating the need
to discuss a petition in the justices’
conference unless at least one justice
wants to consider it, to relying on
law clerks to read the petitions and
summarize them in brief memos.
This latter mechanism relies heavily on the “cert pool”—a cooperative
agreement among most of the justices (currently, all but Justice Alito)
in which the petitions are divided
among the chambers and each petition
is assigned to a single law clerk. The
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cert pool was introduced in the 1970s.
For cases decided on the merits,
however, the Court continued to
feel greatly burdened by its workload in the mid- to late twentieth
century, even as the number of merits
cases shrank. In the 1980s, the Court
heard argument and issued written
opinions in approximately 150 cases
a year. Many observers, and some of
the justices themselves, believed that
150 cases were simply too many for
the Court to handle well. Moreover,
these people argued, the Court was
unable to give truly important cases
the time and attention they needed
in part because of the need to manage the mandatory appeals, which
were often not of interest beyond the
parties themselves. There was much
discussion of some kind of national
court of appeals or other panel to
assist the Supreme Court with the
more mundane cases. Then-Justice
William H. Rehnquist explained at
his 1986 confirmation hearings to be
Chief Justice:
I think if Congress could be persuaded, not ultimately but very
presently, there ought to be a
new national court, frankly
recognized as such, with judges
appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, who
would act as something of a junior
chamber of the Supreme Court,
to hear primarily statutory cases
about which there are presently
conflicts in the circuit[s].
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Photo of Supreme Court Room (in the Capitol), c. 1894, Wittemann Collection, Library of Congress.

A

s we all know, no such dramatic
change occurred. During the
1970s, Congress eliminated mandatory jurisdiction in a number
of types of cases and in 1988, once
again at the justices’ urging, it eliminated almost all of the remaining
direct appeals to the Supreme Court.
The Court, freed from mandatory
appeals and aggressively applying its
certiorari criteria, has been hearing
argument in fewer and fewer cases
a year. In October Term 2011, for
example, the number of cases decided after briefing and oral argument
reached the historic low of 65 cases.
Not only do these numbers place
the Supreme Court caseload at historic lows, but, as Judge Richard A.
Posner has pointed out, when measured as a proportion of all cases in
the federal judicial system, the case-

load is vanishingly small. He “compare[s] the percentage just of federal court cases in which the Court
granted certiorari in 2004—0.11%
(64 divided by 56,396)—with the
corresponding percentage in 1960—
1.6% (60 divided by 3753)” to find
that “the Court reviewed, in relative
terms, almost 15 times as many federal court cases in 1960 as in 2004.”
Put another way, what Frankfurter
and Landis said in 1928 remains just
as true today:
Perhaps the decisive factor in the
history of the Supreme Court
is its progressive contraction of
jurisdiction. . . . In contrast with
the vast expansion of the bounds
of the inferior federal courts, the
scope of review by the Supreme
Court has been steadily narrowed.
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This “progressive contraction,”
both of mandatory jurisdiction and
of the Court’s exercise of its own discretion to hear cases, has reached a
point where the concerns expressed
today about the Supreme Court’s
workload are unprecedented. Commentators and observers today complain that the Court is not taking
enough cases and that the justices
do not work hard enough. In stark
contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
statements at his confirmation hearings, then-Judge John G. Roberts indicated at his hearings in 2005 that
he thought there was “room for the
Court to take more cases.” Nonetheless, since his confirmation, the
Court has not in fact done so. As already noted, the Court decided only
65 cases after briefing and argument
in October Term 2011. Whether
and how Congress—or the Court itself—will ultimately respond to such
complaints and observations, and
what the next 125 years will bring,
remains to be seen. ◆
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